Issues on or off Policy Agenda

How an issue can be kept off a policy agenda

Specialists public policy argued that policy has been developed in order to solve public problems. Therefore the first stage in the policy making process is about acknowledging the existence of a problem and that something should be done about it. However, the competing nature of public problems and among policy actors may determine if a problem to be kept off policy agenda or reach it.

This relationship between the containment and expansion may illustrate the essence of policy making which is based on the struggle between different powers and actors in order to keep the status quo by excluding issues from reaching agenda which may be detrimental to their interests. On the other side, there are groups who exert efforts to place issues on policy agenda in order to further their interests, sometimes aided by their own resources while in other instances by exogenous factors.

Policy agenda highlights the fact that actors are competing to include their demands, issues, or problems on the agenda for serious consideration by the government. Consequently, there are cases when issues are kept off the agenda.

Birkland (2001) states that one of the main uses of political power is to keep ideas and issues on or off the public agenda. He also argues that groups will use their power to influence what reaches the agenda. It is the competition between groups whereby they utilise influence and resources at their disposal. Therefore, the study of power and power distribution has been central to agenda-setting in which three dimensions or models of power have been constructed.

The first dimension of power finds its origins in one of the group theories, pluralism which originated in the US in the 17th century. Robert Dahl, a pluralist advocate argues that “there are multiple centres of power, none of which is wholly sovereign”

However, during the 1960s and 1970s a new school of thinking began to emerge and added a second dimension to the theory of power, the mobilisation of bias. In this context Schattshneider argued that “the system has a strong permanent bias in favour of some groups over others and the strength of “insiders” to shape the political agenda”. Therefore, mobilisation of bias is about ensuring that conflict is managed and contained by the dominant players in the political game as public policy is an activity in which issues are included and excluded (Parsons 1995).
Pertinent to this is Crenson’s study (1971) on air pollution in 52 American cities which showed that some cities have been active in addressing air pollutions whilst others have not. He concluded that in cities such as Gary, a city dominated by a large polluter, US steel, the issue was kept off the agenda through the exercise of power. The power of the organisation was sufficient for it to remain outside the political arena (Crenson cited in Parsons 1995, p.139).

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) encapsulated the process in a new term, non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz cited in Hudson and Lowe 2004). Bachrach and Baratz (1975) elaborated on non-decision making by arguing that in a power context it is based on the additional presupposition that political consensus is commonly shaped by status-quo defenders. Bachrach and Baratz work was based on the study of race relations in the city of Baltimore, USA. It showed how a powerful political-business axis was in centre of the political system operated systematically to screen out and prevent the interests of black minority by co-opting black leaders, state violence against others, labelling prominent black leaders as communists and trouble makers and using the media to invent scares (Amis and Nunan 2009 p 21).

The third dimension views power as being reflected in ideology, systems of meaning, systems of knowledge, and systems of difference (Amis and Nunan 2009). It introduces the idea that people can be manipulated by powerful interests and are not all free as classical pluralists assert (Hudson and Lowe 2004). Therefore, people’s perception and response to issues are captured by a set of ideological predispositions and political values and ideas that created what Crenson (1971) called “political consciousness”. (Crenson cited in Amis and Nunan 2009). It is also what Parsons termed as “deep theory” (Parsons cited inHudson and Lowe 2004).

John Gaventa (1980) in a study on the Appalachia explains why this community remained under the repressive power of a British coal mining company and the local business and the social elite. The study showed that the Appalachia political participation is low because of the people’s own shortcomings such as low education attainment and poverty. However, from the perspective of third dimension of power, social relationships and political ideology are structured over the long term in a way that the mining company remains dominant and the miners cannot conceive of a situation in which they can participate in the decisions affecting their lives. If they decide to rebel against the unfair system the dominant interests can employ their ability to make non-decision and ignore the pressure. In the long run people may stop fighting as they become and remain alienated from politics and quiescence (Gaventa cited in Birkland 2001 p11).

With regard to policy monopoly and control, Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993, 1994) developed an image that explains patterns of agenda-setting behaviour. For them the “image” of a policy problem is significant in that if problems are portrayed as technical rather than social experts will dominate the decision making process, and therefore a specific subsystem group will constrain access to the policy making process and impose a monopoly or a control on the interpretation of a problem and the manner it is conceived and discussed (Baumgartner and Jones cited in Howlett and Marsh 2nd ed.)

Moreover, McKelvey (1976) and Schofield (1976) showed that the absence of a majority-rule equilibrium implies that virtually any policy outcome is possible. Hence, those who control the agenda can engage in all sorts of manipulation (McKelvey 1976; Schofield 1976 cited by Majone in Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 2008, pp. 229-30). Within the same context David Easton (1965) developed A systems Model Of Agenda Control incorporates the notion that the system has a bias against certain inputs which would disturb the status quo or the “black box” i.e. the political system. Therefore, in order to maintain the system mechanisms, gatekeepers, exist to filter out or exclude input which be considered dysfunctional (Easton cited in Amis and Nunan 2009 p19).

Majone (2008) drives an example on agenda control from the EU. She argues that the EU Commission is considered the executive branch of the EU, but it plays a very important role also in the legislative process because of its monopoly of policy initiation. This monopoly has been granted by the founding treaty and is protected by the EU Court of Justice. Hence, no national government can induce the commission to make a specific proposal changing the status quo, unless the proposal also makes the commission better off (Majone,ibid, p.231) .

One of the most sophisticated models in agenda-setting was developed by John Kingdon (1984) based on his study of the of agenda process in the US federal legislative system. Kingdon argued that in order for an issue to enter the formal agenda and to introduce change to existing policy, three streams are required. First, the problem stream which refers to the perception of a problem as a public problem requiring the government action. Second, the policy stream or policy primeval soup which consists of policy entrepreneurs and experts examining problems and proposing solutions. Third, the political stream which is composed of electoral results, national mood, organised political forces, and perceived state of public opinion (Amis and Nunan 2009; Howlett and Ramesh 2nd ed.).

Durant and Diehl (1989) argue in relation to Kingdon’s approach by highlighting the fact that the likelihood of a particular condition becoming a public problem worthy of action, and for one policy solution to arise from a midst the primeval soup to address it, is increased if a coupling or linking of the problem, policy and political streams occur. For this to happen policy windows occasioned by problem opportunities must open. This problem may be predictable such as when legislation comes up for renewal or unpredictable when a focusing event or crisis happens. In all cases open windows are small and scares and do not stay for long (Howlett and March 2nd ed.).

Birkland (2001, p114) states several examples illustrating Kingdon’s approach. For instance, changes in the policy stream can influence the opening of the window. In 1960s, poverty and racism were seen as problems, but were also coupled with what were suggested as new and more effective policies to solve these problems, such as the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the “war on poverty”. Another example relate to changes in people’s perception to a problem and how it will influence the opening of a window. In 1930s people began to perceive unemployment and economic privation not only as a failure in individual initiative but also as a collective problem that required governmental solution under the rubric of New Deal (ibid.,114).

Other circumstances which may enable issues to reach policy agenda are focusing events. In his study of focusing events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, oil spills and other industrial accidents, Birkland (1998) argued that due to their sudden, dramatic and often harmful nature, focusing events give pro-change groups a significant advantage in overcoming barriers established by status quo-oriented groups (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Gaventa 1980, cited in Birkland 1998). Birkland even argues that major events reach the agenda without group promotion through the media propagation and news symbols of the event (ibid.p.5).

One obvious example of focusing event is the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989. The event mobilised policy community such as the employees of Exxon Corporation, environmentalists, fishers, and local coast guard. The incident was on the news and the radio and within hours it was before the general public. Therefore, it was far too short for Exxon and its allies to contain news of the spill, which, therefore, suddenly became a very prominent issue on the agenda (Birkland 2001).

Indicators can be viewed as another enabling factor to get issues onto policy agenda. Weaver (1989) argues that indicators would lead to major improvements in efforts for identifying social problems, develop appropriate response and make government programmes more effective. However, Birkland (2001) claims that the use of numbers by themselves do not have an influence over which an issue gain a greater attention, rather they need to be publicised by interest groups, government agencies, and policy entrepreneurs, who use these numbers to advance their ideas. An example of indicators used by less advantaged groups is the growing gap between rich and poor in the US. Indicators where used to argue that the rich is getting richer and, to some extent, the lowest economic classes are worse off in terms of theri share of wealth (ibid. 115).

In an era reliant on communications and technology, the media has been playing a crucial role on enabling issues onto policy agenda. The scope of exposure the media allows to issues might portray any issue as pressing. McCombs and Shaw (1976) conducted a survey of the agenda-setting role of the media by looking at the way the media influenced the public’s perception of the Watergate affair. They concluded that the media have had a key role in agenda-setting – that is, in the power to determine what topics are discussed (McCombs and Shaw cited in Parsons 1995).

Moreover, Henshel (1990) argues that the role of the media in the agenda process is an important factor to consider in the construction of problems. For example, S. Iyengar et al (1984) conducted two experiments on the impact of the Evening News of evaluating President Carter’s performance. What was surprising that the TV had the effect of defining the policy areas by which the president should be judged. The capacity of the media to set out policy areas and problems is, they argue, something which has many implications for the relationship between the public, policy and politicians as mediated by the TV. (Iyengar el al. Cited in Parsons 1995, p.112).

To sum up, the pre-mentioned argument shows clearly that policy agenda is a vital stage of the policy making process. It is the starting point of furious competition between groups involved in policy making. It exemplifies the struggle of power and power distribution and how this relates to keeping issues off or on the agenda.